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I 
T HE last opinion of Benjamin Nathan Cardozo has taken its place in the Reports. His contribution to the endless fabric through which the law is shaped to the needs of the land is done. 
There is nothing that he can add or subtract from a miscellany of utter-
ance scattered across the pages of many legal volumes. The record is 
complete and closed;' yet it is impossible to assess the exact quality of his 
work or with certainty to assign his place in the great tradition. For in 
his decisions a jurist offers only one of the elements out of which a judg-
ment upon him is to be distilled. The great web of the law gives character 
to his accomplishment; and, as the future sets its pattern, provides the 
perspective against which his craft is defined. The jurist performs; and 
the law and posterity give worth to his contribution. He can only do-
and abide the event. 
For, as Cardozo realized, the jurist is not a solitary artist. He plies 
his craft as a common task. In a sense such a community of effort touches 
all creative effort; it marks the work of the playwright, the novelist, the 
musician and the painter. As old plays were little by little fitted to the 
temper of late Elizabethan times, the dramas of Shakespeare emerged; 
a London audience and an exuberant England were as much their creators 
as the dramatist who shaped his lines to their reception. In names like 
Defoe, Fielding, Scott, George Eliot, Thackeray, Galsworthy, and Wal-
pole, the English novel retains its continuity. It is the allegory of John 
Bunyan done into a mundane story; the characters, however human, re-
main saints and sinners, and the Puritan tradition remains to point the 
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moraU In music the stamp of the age underlines the mark of the com-
poser. Mozart is the quintessence of the later eighteenth century in all 
its charm, courtly form and elegance. Beethoven was sensitive to the 
forces of humanism and democracy released by the French Revolution. 
He was fed up on the existing order, wanted to say "God-damn," and in 
his most passionate moments needed a piano or an orchestra to help him 
say it.3 Wagner converted the cause of good against evil into a militant 
nationalism and hymned aspirations which are epic and Teutonic and 
tainted with vain glory. He created musical dramas which have outlasted 
an empire and a republic to serve a totalitarian state. Rimsky-Korsakoff 
was a professor of music in the Royal Conservatory at a time when Rus-
sia's ambitions turned to the east; and the Scheherazade Suite glows with 
the colors of Oriental aspirations.4 The artist always exhibits a unique 
quality, marked by talent and often rising to genius; but time smothers 
contemporaries beneath oblivion and distorts into a sharp perspective 
the blurred lines of individual performance.5 In every art the creator 
stands in his tradition and plies his trade in consort with his fellows. 
Above all others the jurist pursues a common calling. Like painter and 
sculptor the impulses which touch off his creative work come from without 
his own shop. From the outside, too, are derived the stuff of idea and val-
ue, of circumstance and occasion from which he fashions his opinions. A 
master of music gives his creative touch to a handful of folk tunes-and 
a great symphony emerges. But, unlike musician or dramatist, the stim-
ulus comes to the jurist by compulsion rather than suggestion. A situa-
• Vice is too attractive to resist :fictional depiction. Fortunately the novelist had the moral 
at hand to take the taboo off. Note, e.g., the parade of crime and sin in The Newgate Calendar, 
sanctified by the "bad end" to which all villainy came. 
J An unforgettable story gives character to Beethoven's music. It is recorded that on one 
occasion he was walking along a street with Goethe. A trumpet sound announced the approach 
of a mighty one of earth. Goethe, like the populace, drew up to the curb and remained un-
covered until His Highness had passed. Beethoven, with strident step and hat on, pursued 
his way through the crowd. The next day, he tells us, he wrote to Goethe and told him "ex-
actly what he thought of him." Perhaps the coldness of Goethe to Beethoven's music has, if 
not cause, at least incidental occasion. 
4 Remove its co=unal background and a work of art loses its meaning. In America 
Rimsky-Korsakoff's famous Song of India is usually entrusted to the soprano. In accord 
with her homespun tradition she brings to it the nostalgia of Home Sweet Home and extracts 
from it the last drop of imported saccarine. But, as sung by the Kedroff Quartet, who follow 
the score in Sadko, it is the song of the merchant bragging about the wealth of his country-
the eyes of Russia are upon the East. 
s Again the Scheherazade Suite exhibits the process. The Thamar Overture of Balakirev 
s an earlier and cruder version of the same Russian cry for the Orient. Almost all the ideas, 
so colorfully developed by Rimsky-Korsakoff, are there. Many musicians prefer the earlier, 
severer and less gaudy version. 
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tion in life touches off a conflict, is converted into a cause of action, and 
demands his attention. As best he may he must find his way through a 
conflict of considerations to an answer that will do. The jurist takes a 
nucleus of facts, adds a bit of common sense-and deftly chisels a rule of 
law. 
In such a venture he works at once with liberty and amid constraints. 
Here is a tangle out of life, a question about human conduct, a resort to 
the courts, a reference to the norms of legality. The "facts" emerge from 
a narrative, involve the mores of a group, and ramify into the design of a 
changing culture. The "rule" lies somewhere within a mighty corpus 
which comprehends "the common law," the tomes of the statutes, the 
boundless wilderness of the reports. Amid such a group of variables there 
is endless choice-in selecting the "real" issue, in winnowing out the 
"relevant" facts, in :finding the "applicable" rules. In matters of strat-
egy, such as striking the key for decision, putting the question, invoking 
the compulsions, and marshaling the argument the jurist has scope for 
wide discretion. In the detail of tactics-the creation of atmosphere, 
the choice of acceptable words,6 the parade of intangibles, the subtle 
touch upon the sources of persuasion-he can give play to varied skills. 
In cases of consequence questions remain open until the issue is resolved; 
in "the opinion of the court" the mark of the craft of the spokesman is 
indelible. It is only where social conditions have been static or benches 
have remained adamant, that the formula for decision has become a 
stereotype. It has taken the hardened disciple of the law, with its beat 
in endless reiteration, to make of judgment even an orderly procedure. 
But a decent restraint attends the jurist's freedom. In judgment, in 
ratio decedendi, and even in obiter dicta, he must respect the wisdom which 
the centuries have brought. He accepts here, qualifies there, distinguishes 
yonder, and fabricates an opinion whose lines run out into the general 
fabric of the law. Even when, in the unusual case, he fashions anew, his 
judgment is formed with scrupulous regard to what courts have said. 
His break with authority must be justified-in the failure of an old rule 
to work, in the fact that people no longer think that way, in a newness of 
conditions which makes an innovation necessary. The bench imposes a 
further restraint; the jurist's urge to hand down his own justice has a 
curb in the presence of his brethren. He must, if he is to speak for the 
court, admit his colleagues to his authorship. An addition here to win 
6 Among judges Cardozo was among the keenest in his appreciation of the relation of diction 
to decision. Logic may convince but it is the word that persuades. In the dubious case the 
thin line between the reasonableness or unreasonableness of an action may turn upon the 
word used to describe it. See Cardozo, Literature and the Law, pp. r-4o (1931). 
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Brother X, an omission there to hold Brother Y, a suiting of the argu-
ment to the general tolerance of the group are essentials to his right to 
speak. Even his rhetoric must be subdued to the ears of his brethren. 7 
If he would utter all that is upon his mind, he is driven to the isolation of 
the concurring opinion or to the luxury of dissent. Nor can he limit his 
consideration to the values of the hour. A case may be of little conse-
quence yet pregnant with consequences. His task may involve no more 
than a few stitches, yet he must have regard to the direction he imposes 
upon the threads. In his scattered bits of craftsmanship the jurist must 
keep faith with the pattern of the cloth. 
The craft of Cardozo must be appraised as an aspect of the enveloping 
law. His concern is with crime, with contract and tort, with the wiles of 
procedure and the strange ways of equitable relief, with the police power 
and the law of the Constitution, with the curious legal folkways of the 
people of New York and of the United States of America. Here and there 
he is at grips with an issue in public policy that lies along the frontier of 
public control. More often some problem of an industrialism on the march 
can be resolved only by reference to the host of holdings which impinge 
upon judgment. The great mass of his work is concerned with small inci-
dents, issues of detail, petty accommodations, seeming trivia which the 
historian or the philosopher would pass up as unworthy of his mettle. 
Yet hardly an opinion of his is confined to the space within which it is 
cabined. In reference, citation and precedent it gathers lines of doctrine, 
draws them to its passing focus, and imposes upon them its fragment of 
design. In the reports hundreds of such judgments bear the name of Car-
dozo, each in its reach a-something-more-than-itself in microcosm.8 The 
part is merged in the whole, the opinion comprehends the decisions from 
7 A confession of Mr. Justice Holmes, still I believe unpublished, makes the point: "I 
write an opinion. It states the facts, it comes to grips with the issues, the argument marches, 
it reaches a right result. And occasionally I :flatter myself that it is not without literary quality. 
Then I circulate it among my brethren. The Chief Justice puts in his thumb and pulls out a 
plum. Mr. Justice Pitney puts in his thumb and pulls out a plum. And even my good brother 
Brandeis is likely to reach for my juiciest plum. And, when they are done, it is nothing but 
stinking dung." The writer was, however, told by one of his colleagues that Mr. Justice 
Holmes had not spent his boyhood in New England to no purpose, that he adroitly prepared 
the sacrifices to the bargaining process, and that the opinions as they emerged from the 
scrutiny of his brethren were about as he wanted them to be. But if the opinions, as set down 
in the Reports, are "stinking dung," who has a soul that he would not trade in as part payment 
for the originals? 
s It is of significance that the word "microcosm" was popular with Cardozo. His fondness 
for it indicates alike the importance he attached to seemingly trivial matters and his capacity 
to see the large in the small. A schoolman can give his attention only to cosmic things; the 
great artist discovers humanity in the ordinary doings of the common man. 
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which it stems, the lines of argument reach out toward future judg-
ments.9 Occasion and holding have a significance that extends beyond 
their confines; in its very abundance the incident provides the raw ma-
terial through which the law renews its youth. Remove these living utter-
ances from the reports, put them between covers, and they become mu-
seum pieces, idle bits of delicate craftsmanship, frozen suggestions of 
causes once instant with pulsing life.'0 The natural habitat of Cardozo's 
opinions is the law reports. 
II 
The appearance of Cardozo upon the judicial scene was too unobtrusive 
to be dated. As a man of books with an interest in affairs he slipped 
quietly out of college into the practice of law. There the curious mind, 
the balanced judgment, the eye for implication, the social conscience, the 
impulse to probe deeply were more than the trade of advocate could 
satisfy. The urges and capacities within could find full scope only upon 
the bench. In 1914 he was "designated" to sit upon the New York Court 
of Appeals. In 1917, by election of the people, he became a regular mem-
ber of that tribunal and ten years later he was chosen Chief Judge. It 
was a "good courtP-among the best in the country-to which he was 
appointed and presently it was "Cardozo's court." For his leadership 
was recognized by colleagues, by the profession and by the public long 
before he became "the Chief." 
Leaders are not of a kind; and the manner of the man made him the 
kind of a leader he was. He had nothing of the authority, the majestic 
stride, the thunderous voice from Sinai of a Marshall as he dominated 
colleagues and drove his argument to its inescapable conclusion. Instead, 
in respect to his gifts and his judgments, he was among the humblest of 
men. What he knew seemed to him of trifling account against the back-
ground of the great unknown. He was far more concerned to find out 
than to maintain a position and had no pride in opinion-save the artist's 
inner joy in a bit of work neatly done.II He was almost an ideal leader 
9 A handful of plays, of stories, or of sonatas may reveal a Chekov, a Somerset Maugham, 
or a Johannes Brahms; we must invoke the law which envelops to give meaning and value to 
the multitude of legal miniatures which are Cardozo. 
10 Attempts to lift the opinions of jurists from their legal habitat and to unify them into 
sequences of essays have been none too successful. In The Dissenting Opinions of Mr. Justice 
Holmes and The Social and Economic Views of Mr. Justice Brandeis, edited by Mr. Alfred Lief, 
one gets something of the manner of man, the way of mind, the quality of argument, the adroit 
use of citation, statistic and concept. But the arena is gone, the other combatant has to be taken 
for granted, and action is no longer permeated by the atmosphere of the law in the making. 
11 See especially Benjaman N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1924). 
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for a venture into legal understanding. The quiet charm, the quaint 
touch of dress, the play of mind, the high button shoes, the eager reach 
of mind, the humorous :flash of eye, the sincere consideration of others, 
the bare hint of other-worldliness marked the unusual man. 
Cardozo was, as his office demanded, "learned in the law." He knew it 
as a technique, as the craft of a workman, as a challenge to judgment, as 
a scheme of values which an instrument of justice must obey-and not as 
an august corpus or a collection of rigid formulas. He was, as a master 
of the lore, able to match syllogisms and citations with the best of his 
brethren. But he was much too aware of the tricks which concept and 
symbol, label and verbalism play upon the nodding judge to be taken in 
by them. He understood that color of word is as important as choice of 
category; that the telling phrase carries as far as the march of logic; that 
the start of the opinion depends upon the way the question is put; that 
the end of the argument lies in its beginning. Nor did he often forget that 
back of the legal issue lay a human muddle fresh from life, which the 
court must resolve as best it could. He had the rare gift of probing through 
voluminous records, grounding his judgment upon reality, giving to nov-
elty the verisimilitude of that which is established, and :fitting current 
necessity with the trappings of the ancient law. His strength lay in his 
"judicial mind," his capacity for staying judgment until the case was in, 
his skill at analysis, his command of common sense, his capacity to turn 
his understanding into a verbal currency that passed easily from mind to 
mind. It was not in his nature to drive; he required no office to give effect 
to what he never thought of as his authority. His appeal lay in his 
powers of persuasion and the rare quality of his leadership. He led-
and his court followed. 
As he found his stride, he discovered that law-far from being a stand-
ard of certainty-is an instrument of justice. Its devices and procedures 
make up a kit of tools with which the skilled craftsman plies his trade. 
In his utterance there is none of the nonsense about the judge who lays 
the facts alongside the law or "measures the statute against the Constitu-
tion," and as an automaton sets down the result. Instead reason calls a 
rule of law into being and its meaning cannot be pent up within the words 
in which it is cast. Its purpose rather than its verbal form must be its 
ultimate reference. A rule which has strayed from its intent becomes 
subject to judicial doubt. 
In a familiar :field of the law, he recites without a trace of novelty what 
the most conservative lawyer would accept. Yet a freshness of rhetoric 
and an appeal to reason bring current life to an ancient distinction. "The 
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schism in the law of defamation" is not "the product of mere accident." 
Many things "said with impunity through the medium of speech" change 
their character "when speech is caught upon the wing and transmuted into 
print." For "the spoken word dissolves, but the written one abides and 
perpetuates the scandal."12 In a case concerned with the conduct of a 
bank official, his "appeal is to the mores rather than the statute." To 
him "dishonesty is not a term of art." Its meaning emanates from "no 
standard of perfection, but an infirmity of purpose so opprobrious or 
furtive as to be fairly characterized" as such "in the common speech of 
man."13 A duty rests upon a purveyor to come across with the supply of 
molasses which by contract he is obligated to furnish; he is not to be ex-
cused "if output is reduced because times turn out to be bad and labor 
costs high." For "business could not be transacted with" security or 
smoothness if a presumption so unreasonable were at the root of its en-
gagements."14 
If reason makes the rule, reason appoints the limits to its application. 
A sheaf of precedents is not an array of imperatives compelling judgment. 
It is the history of experience with the rule-as set down in the laboratory 
records of human conflict called the law reports. The essence of its varied 
wisdom must be distilled by the jurist and applied to the case in hand. 
Danger lurks in the legal command divorced from its origin in occasion. 
"The half truths of one generation tend at times to perpetuate them-
selves in the law as the whole truths of another"; "constant repetition 
brings it about that qualifications, taken once for granted, are disre-
garded or forgotten."xs The jurist must be alert lest a holding be extended 
into territory where it can claim no rightful dominion. Thus a rule-the 
specific reference is to incorporation- "is not a doctrinaire demand for 
an unattainable perfection; it has its limits in the considerations of prac-
tical expediency that brought it into being. "16 Or again, "few formulas 
are so absolute as not to bend before the blast of extraordinary circum-
stances."17 In short, "there are signposts for the traveler";18 but "equity 
I2 Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 39. I75 N.E. 505, 506 (I93I). 
IJ World Exchange Bank v. Co=ercial Casualty Ins. Co., 255 N.Y. r, 5, 173 N.E. 902, 
903 (1930). 
I4 Canadian Industrial Alcohol Co. v. Dunbar Molasses Co., 258 N.Y. 194, 199, 200, 179 
N.E. 383, 384 (1932). 
IS Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua Co. Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 373, 159 N.E. 173, 
174 (1927). 
I6 In re Rausch's Will, 258 N.Y. 327, 333, 179 N.E. 755, 757 (1932). 
I7 Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Sahlem, 254 N.Y. r6r, r67, 172 N.E. 455, 457 (1930). 
IS I d., at r67. 
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is not crippled by an inexorable formula. "1 9 The judge is not to abdicate 
his office to a rigid verbalism which pretends to be the law. 
In general Cardozo is content to take his freedom within the constraints 
of ordinary usage. His forbearance may even extend to a ruling as stupid 
as it is venerable.20 But at times even such a patience is fretted by some 
archaic device with which the jurist must try to reach a satisfactory re-
sult. An import borne along with the common law from England is "the 
rule of the four seas." It makes use of a simple presumption to overcome 
the hazards of probability and fix the legal status of a child. If during the 
period of pregnancy the husband is resident somewhere within the wide 
area marked out by the four seas, the law assumes for him access to the 
mother and decrees legitimacy for the child. Far be it from Cardozo that 
an issue "be bastardized as the outcome of a choice between nicely bal-
anced probabilities." But such a presumption must not "consecrate as 
truth the extravagantly improbable," which "for ends juridical" may be 
one "with the indubitably false." The presumption falls because "sense 
and reason are outraged by a holding that it abides." After all, even in 
the law, "there are barriers in human nature at which presumptions shock 
and wither"; and abandoned must be "the nonsense of the rule of four 
seas."21 So, too, Cardozo and his court leave many another piece of 
museum legalism-abandoned and unlamented. 
A defter stroke, however, is evident in holding the balance between 
rules. The statute compels of course; "but the statute must be read in 
conformity with common-law analogies"22 A writ of habeas corpus to 
secure custody of a child must not await the outcome of a suit to annul a 
marriage. The child must not be left in a "corrupting custody. while 
father and mother debate their private grievances." For "the law does 
not wait upon the niceties of procedure," nor does it "dally and dawdle" 
with the safety of the ward at stake. Instead "it leaps to the rescue with 
the aid of its historic writ."23 An act of justice is not to be defeated 
by ?- technical shortcoming. A judgment must be made good even if 
'9 Marr v. Tumulty, 256 N.Y. IS, 2I, I75 N.E. 356, 359 (I93I). 
•• People v. Lytton, 257 N.Y. 3Io, I78 N.E. 290 (I93I). 
2
' It was quite a tangle that broke on the issue of legitimacy. It may be that the case could 
have been handled in no other way. It is by no means certain that the justice done was in 
accord with co=on sense. Both courts below came to another result and throughout his 
opinion the attention of Cardozo is far more intent upon "the rule of the four seas" than upon 
instant act of justice. The curious reader may pursue the subject further in Matter of Findlay, 
253 N.Y. I, I70 N.E. 47I (I930). The quotations here are at p. 8. 
22 Curson v. Federal Reserve Bank, 254 N.Y. 2I8, 238, 172 N.E. 475, 482 (I93o). 
23 People ex rel. McCanliss v. McCanliss, 255 N.Y. 456, 46I, I75 N.E. 129, I3o (I931). 
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there is currently at hand no procedure to give it effect. "All there will 
be need to do will be to stay the enforcement" until the plaintiff shall 
"have become qualified to collect in accordance with the foreign law."•4 
But the urge that calls all the jurist's skill into play comes from princi-
ples in combat. In the "spring-board case" the clash extended from rules, 
through ideologies, to a schism in social philosophies-and Cardozo re-
sponded with a characteristic opinion. A boy, intent upon enjoying a 
swim in the Hudson, was about to dive from a springboard projected from 
the property of a railway company. At that moment, as he was poised 
over the public waters, a live wire on the company's right of way fell and 
electrocuted him. It was argued, in terms of the ancient law, that the 
plank was a projection of property, that the youth was a trespasser, that 
the deceased was without right and the corporation without duty. In an 
adroit reply Cardozo ranged from the sheer gymnastics of dialectic to the 
compulsions of social policy. He finds it irrelevant that the plank was 
"an extension of the soil," that the boy had "abandoned the highway," 
that a bather had fallen into the status of a trespasser. "Rights and 
duties in systems of living law are not built upon quicksands." He stood 
the plank upon its end, considered "the circumambient spaces of water 
and of air"; and rejected "a jurisprudence of conceptions" which with a 
"relentless disregard of consequences" pushes a maxim to "a dryly logical 
extreme." He summoned realism, made the use of the plank "a mere by-
play" and gave to the youth protection in his "exercise of public rights 
upon public waters." It is all very much of a legal to-do, a display of 
craft which commands the admiration of his brethren, a parade of argu-
ment which no rebutting legalism can halt. The net result is that there 
are rights other than those of the landlord; that real property is no longer 
an absolute at whose shrine the conveniences of the landless are as noth-
ing. Against rights beaten into the law by fox-hunting squires, to whom 
poaching is the greatest of all crimes, Cardozo helps to make articulate 
the aspirations of a less privileged group. His intricate and nimble dialec-
tic gives voice to a revolution in caste, in values and in ideas."5 
In fact the strain which a rising industrialism imposes upon the ancient 
law creates the most insistent demand for his services. The reports bristle 
with cases in which rules of the long ago must be accommodated to the 
current necessities of the people. A notion of "privity" was a veritable bul-
wark of justice when communities were small and relations largely per-
sonal. But current business runs strongly against it; and Cardozo clearly 
24 Wikoff v. Hirschel, 258 N.Y. 28, 31, 179 N.E. 249, 250 (1932). 
25 Hynes v. New York Central R.R. Co., 231 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898 (1921). 
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saw that "the assault upon the citadel of privity is proceeding in these 
days apace."•6 Again and again he considers the doctrine; and, although 
loath to disturb overmuch an established notion he lends his hand to the 
assault. In this domain a ground-breaking opinion of his has become a 
classic.•1 An injury to the owner of an automobile was due to a defect in 
a wheel which had escaped inspection. The law, according to the authori-
ties, is privity of contract. As a result appears a curious paradox. Privity 
gives to the dealer a right to sue but he had suffered no injury; the owner 
of the motor-car can boast an injury but is without privity. With hardly 
a bow to novelty, Cardozo harnesses established principle to a new neces-
sity; the elements of a fresh holding are all within reach and his craft 
deftly draws them into place. At the coming of individualism absolute 
liability did not completely fade from the law; one kept on one's premises 
a cobra, a lion, a pool of water, or T.N.T. at his peril. As extraordinary 
circumstances were encountered, the courts gave the doctrine a limited 
run in the ambit of business where privity was supposed to reign. At the 
point of origin one must not falsely label a poison, allow a defect in a 
balance wheel, make "a dangerous trap of a scaffold," hire out a horse 
known to be vicious, or allow "a potency of danger" to be fabricated into 
a coffee urn. Cardozo sounds the issue in tort and shortcircuits immediate 
holdings. He calls the automobile a "dangerous instrument" ;•8 hurls 
against privity the notion of the good "at large" or "in circulation"; 
distills personal blame from precedents which stem from the older doc-
trine, turns unconditional liability to the support of the rule of no lia-
bility without fault-and the trick is done. Save from casual references, 
such as to "the days of travel by stage coach," it all moves upon the legal 
level; yet the result is calculated "to serve the needs of life in a develop-
ing civilization." The net result is clean cut. The law of privity did well 
in the good old days when articles were fashioned by the maker to the 
buyer's order. But when goods came to be produced for the market the 
personal touch was lost; and, with the appearance of the middleman, 
privity failed in its office. Conditions had gone astray-the new rule 
allowed the law to accord its ancient protection.29 
•6 Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E: 441 (1931). 
•1 Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, III N.E. 1050 (1916). 
2s The concept of "a dangerous instrument" is very popular with Cardozo. Note, e.g., 
"one cannot place an engine of destruction in a position where a heedless touch by someone else 
will awaken its destructive power." De Haen v. Rockwood Sprinkler Co., 258 N.Y. 350, 353, 
I79 N.E. 764, 765 (1932). 
29 In short the scope of one established holding, Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N.Y. 396 (1852), 
is enlarged as a means of blocking the way of another established holding, Winterbottom v. 
Wright, 10M. & W. 107 (1842). 
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It was in this fashion that he wrought. By such displays of craftsman-
ship he won the admiration of his brethren, who constantly marveled 
"at some new and unexpected facet" of his "genius."30 As a sincere judge, 
confronted with an endless array of enigmas from a modem culture, he 
groped; and as he groped he grew. His is not always the sure touch; one 
finds opinions of technical excellence that seem lost because lasting values 
are not yet at hand to give direction to argument. He accepts without 
question the contagious magic by which a single package from across the 
border imparts its interstate character to the local train. Thus he insu-
lates all its activities against the state government.31 He preaches, like 
any practitioner whose reliance is the Corpus Juris, that "the law should 
hold fast to fundamental conceptions of contract and of duty and follow 
them with loyalty to logical conclusions."32 Yet he could, in words that 
carry a threat to many an established formulation, insist that the quest 
"for the normal and the typical" is futile; that "every effect is natural 
when there is complete knowledge of the cause"; and that "in the com-
plexities of modem life, one does not know where the ordinary ends and 
the extraordinary begins."33 He is conscious that "we are not gifted with 
the power to discover truth with mathematical certitude" ;34 laments the 
fact that courts are "at the mercy of the diligence and skill" of counsel, 
and confesses that they are helpless "to speak the word of truth if the facts 
are not uncovered for them."35 He is conscious always that his own deci-
sions, born of limited understanding, are at best cqntributions to a de-
veloping law. 
As year followed year he found :firmer terrain. He was driven to a 
search for social values as an escape from the confusion with which rule 
and citation, principle and precedent beat upon him. It is usually legal 
utterance which in his opinions marches in complex formation to a single 
therefore. Yet one feels that it is some consideration of policy-to 
Cardozo himself not quite articulate-which determines the direction of 
march. He remains throughout rather the lawyer whose arguments are 
directed to public ends than the social philosopher who makes the tech-
nology of law his instrument. If he had made explicit the sources of his 
J• Address by his colleagues to Chief Judge Benjamin N. Cardozo, on his retirement from 
the New York Court of Appeals, 258 N.Y. vi (1932). 
J' Libertucci v. New York Central R.R. Co., 252 N.Y. 182, 169 N.E. 132 (1929). 
J• Imperator Realty Co. v. Tull, 228 N.Y. 447, 127 N.E. 263 (1920). 
33 Kerr S.S. Co. v. Radio Corp., 245 N.Y. 284, 290, 157 N.E. 140, 142 (1927). 
34 People v. Barbato, 254 N.Y. 170, 177, 172 N.E. 458, 461 (1930). 
JS Matter of Edge Ho Holding Co., 256 N.Y. 374, 381-2, 176 N.E. 537, 538 (1931). 
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own preferences, his influence upon the bench and his authority within 
his profession might have been less compelling. 
For eighteen years Cardozo carried on at Albany. The courts of a 
metropolitan and industrial state touch men at every point. The judge 
who amid the hubbub of change would hold the law true to its office must 
be a jack-of-all-trades. The tangle of family relations, the confusion over 
inheritance, the equities in corporate property, a law of contract as broad 
as all business, the qualities making for merchantability, the bothers of 
recently emancipated women, the safeguarding of the worker in a society 
madly gone mechanistic, the problems which the growth of the city 
brings, the relation of the state to its hierarchy of agencies, the taming of 
an unruly economic order to the needs of a people-all these and a hundred 
more appeared upon Cardozo's crowded docket. There is hardly an aspect 
of the law, from the definition of insanity to the rights of the trade union, 
which at his hands did not feel the impact of a larger humanism. Under 
his leadership the New York Court of Appeals became the best court in 
the land. What it decided today was likely to become the law of many 
another commonwealth tomorrow. 
III 
As a state judge Cardozo became a national figure. His name, his atti-
tude, his books came to be known to attorneys, to judges, and to the laity. 
A large public, unmindful that his was already a national office, insisted 
that his proper place was at Washington. Liberals and lawyers, labor 
unions and business executives-hardly one in faith, in doctrine, or in 
definition of American institutions-united their voices in a demand for 
his judicial services. So in 1932 he became a member of the United States 
Supreme Court. He appeared-as the choice of the Judiciary Committee 
of the Senate and with some reluctance on the part of the Chief Execu-
tive-as the inevitable successor to Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. 
Until that event his life had been all of a piece. The transition from 
Albany to Washington was an abrupt break. He had not sought the post, 
but he graciously accepted an office which came as a token of appreciation 
from the people. A number of discerning persons regretted the move for 
they considered his old work fully as important as the new. The elevation 
removed him from the environment to which he was accustomed, dis-
turbed the Albany-New York axis about which he had organized his ac-
tivities, upset a pattern of life many years in the making, and made more 
difficult contacts with old friends. 36 The atmosphere of the new Court 
36 His pattern of life, with his circle of friends, was of supreme importance to Cardozo. 
The bond was there even with one who could claim no intimate acquaintance. One hesitated, 
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was colder, its personal difierences sharper, its sensitiveness to the office 
of the law more blunt, its spirit of cooperation less manifest than the one 
to which he had been accustomed. The spirit of the Court-many mem-
bers of which were insulated against the thought, the knowledge, the im-
pulses, the aspirations of the age-was still that of a Mr. Justice Field 
more than a generation ago gathered to his fathers. But it was not the 
spirit of the virile Field of another age but a Field now grown decadent 
through lack of contact with actuality. The older liberty-and-property, 
with an accent which an America on-the-make had placed on the last 
word, had become a blind regard for vested privilege. For thirty years 
Holmes had kept alive the ancient notion of "the common good." Bran-
deis was blazing trails for public welfare which constitutional law was 
invited to follow. Stone was bringing to decision the skepticism of the 
law teacher and the passion of the honest man for the truth. Save for the 
last two the court was less able-as lawyers, as men of the world, as phi-
losophers-than his old bench, and some of the members were stubborn 
beyond all reason. Moreover, power still lay with the Harding appointees 
and such moves as liberalism was allowed to take followed the timid 
paths of Hughes and of Roberts. The era which had closed with the re-
tirement of Holmes was great in little more than the-law-as-it-might-be 
enunciated in dissent. 
To Cardozo the hurly-burly could not mean what it meant to the 
others. The excitement of the docket, the round of argument and con-
ference and decision, the importance of sitting in judgment on mighty 
matters could not have for him the stirring charm it offered the novice. 
Holmes could take it; he had been an Olympian to whom the judgments 
of the most powerful court on earth were merely casual incidents in the 
annals of man. Brandeis had found a mission; he was a militant champion 
of democracy, anxious to spread his opinions upon the record and certain 
of the ultimate outcome. Stone had found an exciting workshop; he was 
a scientist, intent upon finding out, and concerned to explore rather than 
to reform. He was able to impose a discipline upon his personal prefer-
ences and willing to allow the causes themselves to dictate his conclu-
sions. But unlike them Cardozo could not meet such a situation as a 
pioneer adventure. Matters on which the Court divided were often water 
which had already passed under his bridge. He wanted to carry on from 
where he had left off at Albany. Yet he was asked to tum back the clock; 
to refight against unreasonable opposition old battles; to keep alive doc-
without a concrete excuse, to break in on his busy-ness; yet he would gently complain, by the 
word of a mutual friend, that you had not been in to see him. 
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trines which he regarded as ghosts.37 He was by character and experience 
one who worked with the group. In his old court, free as was the expres-
sion of opinion, there had been no cleavage down the bench which per-
sisted with the years. A separate utterance now and then by one· who 
could not go along only served to throw into sharp relief the common 
accord. In his sixties high office and circumstance imposed upon Cardozo 
the novel role of dissenter.38 
A term of six years is short as tenure goes. Only Moody and the elder 
Lamar have within so short a period made a bid for eminence. Cardozo's 
opportunity was scant; he welcomed only one new colleague to the inner 
circle; until within half a year of the end he remained the junior justice. 
Yet he could hardly have turned his years to fuller account; he handled 
far more than his share of the ordinary work of litigation, and because of 
his eminence his assignments were rather better than a novice might ex-
pect. In minor matters he was free to speak, almost without restraint, 
for his court; and, in a sample of opinion selected almost at random, is 
evident the touch which gives identity to the distinctive craft. The 
president of a bankrupt corporation seeks to evade an order for a summary 
return of properties appropriated on the ground that "the general descrip-
tion" is not "an inventory of items." Cardozo retorts that "words are 
symbols" whose "significance varies with the knowledge and experience 
of the mind receiving them." "How many identifying tokens we are to 
exact the reason and common sense of the situation must tell us."39 He 
is called upon gracefully to reverse an opinion of Holmes that the duty 
of a motorist at a grade crossing is to dismount and make observations.40 
He makes his bow to his predecessor's dictum, takes the sting out of the 
text with a gloss, and sets it down that "to get out of a vehicle and recon-
noitre" is "very likely to be futile and sometimes even dangerous." By 
the time the driver "regains his seat and sets his car in motion the hidden 
37 It was not the retracing of specific steps that troubled Cardozo, for the new problems were 
different in their sweep. Probably he regretted leaving the role of trail-blazer for an all but 
baflling attempt to bring about at Washington a judicial attitude resembling that to which his 
labors has brought the Court at Albany. Before his old court time and again had appeared 
causes whose concern was workmen's compensation, labor standards, trade union activities, 
the regulation of securities, civil liberties, unfair competition, the conduct of administrative 
tribunals and the police power in general. In such matters Cardozo himself often spoke for his 
court. The instances are far too numerous to justify a catalogue here. The interested reader 
can readily explore the matter for himself in the New York reports. 
38 It is ominous that, ·although he tried to avoid it, his first opinion as a member of the 
United States Supreme Court had to be a dissent. See Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932). 
39 Cooper v. Dasher, 290 U.S. 106, 109 (1933). 
4• Baltimore and Ohio R.R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). 
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train may be upon him."41 A bit of practical experience with an auto-
mobile has ripened into a rule of law. A suit for infringement, and a prayer 
for an accounting is pending when the federal income tax first goes into 
effect. In 1924, some thirteen years later, a decree awards the profits of 
the infringer to the lawful owner of the patent. Although the bulk of 
the sum accrues before 1913, the United States levies its tax upon the full 
amount and the tax-payer sues to recover. Cardozo can discover no 
"property" which has "an ascertainable value" as of March I, 1913. 
The amount-accruing when litigation has run its course-is not "capi-
tal"; it is income for "within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment" 
income "is the fruit that is born of capital, not the potency of fruition."4• 
A challenge of an act of Georgia providing for the regulation of private 
motor carriers is refused. The Court will not consider the constitutionality 
of the statute until the meaning and validity of its clauses have been 
passed upon by the highest court of the state. In the absence of "its con-
struction and application of a local law," we "are deprived of an im-
portant aid to the nice performance of our duties," and to us "the need 
for forbearance is commanding." After all "this court is a court of re-
view and limits the exercise of its jurisdiction in accordance with its 
function."43 As the months passed Cardozo came to be almost a regular 
spokesman upon matters of process and jurisdiction. A case-involving 
a national bank, the demand for a money judgment, and the circum-
stances of the depression-is in the offing. The issue is of little inherent 
consequence, yet the decision is made to reach to the fundamentals of the 
institution of litigation. "To define broadly and in the abstract" a case 
arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States demands 
"something of that common sense accommodation of judgment to kaleido-
scopic situations which characterizes the law in its treatment of problems 
of causation." One could "carry the search for causes backward, almost 
without end"; but bounds must be set to the pursuit and "a selective 
process picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the other 
ones aside."44 
All law is public law; but at Washington Cardozo had more formal 
concern with policy than at Albany. He sometimes spoke for the Court 
when advances were made in minor salients; in matters of significance 
4' Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 104 (1934). 
42 United States v. Safety Car Heating and Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936). 
4J Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Public Service Co=ission, 295 U.S. 285, 294 
(1935) • 
.w Gully v. First National Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117-u8 (1936). 
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he was more likely to be heard in dissent. But the years have their way 
even with solemn pronouncements upon the Constitution; and at this 
moment of hurried transition no one can certainly say that his personal 
opinion is less the law than that set down as "of the court." Here political 
theory, the realities of industry, and the values of public policy all have 
their due; and the social implications of his technology have ripened into 
a philosophy to direct it. He speaks for the court in the regulation of rail-
ways, the valuation of utilities, the imposition of fiduciary obligations 
upon those who handle other people's money, the fortification of the 
sources of revenue against. the tax-dodger, the relation of the administra-
tive commission to the courts. 
Among a multitude of causes civil liberty seems of most concern to 
him. In according to the rights of man the protection of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, he helps to write a new chapter in the history of due proc-
ess. 45 When another speaks for the Court-as when a denial of justice 
entitles "the Scottsboro boys" to a new trial-he goes along.46 When it is 
held that no privilege of a citizen is being invaded by compulsory military 
training in a land grant college, he concurs. "A different doctrine would 
carry us to lengths that have never yet been dreamed of." But he finds it 
expedient to add a word to make it clear that "religious liberty" is by 
the Fourteenth Amendment protected against invasion by the states."47 
And when the Court refuses to allow a hearing to a negro convicted of 
sedition under a Georgia statute drawn from moth balls, he is sharp in 
dissent. The question is, "will men judging in calmness" say that "the 
defendant's conduct" was "an attempt to stir up revolution through the 
power of his persuasion"? And if so, "will the Constitution of the United 
States uphold a reading of the statute that will lead to that response"? 
To these questions, upon which life or death depends the defendant 
4S It is often forgotten that the initial attempt to blow the breath of life into the Four-
teenth Amendment was on behalf of the rights of man. See the briefs of ex-Justice John A. 
Campbell in the Slaughter House Cases, r6 Wall. (U.S.) 36 (r873). The briefs are on record in 
the Library of Congress. 
46 Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (r935); Patterson v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 6oo (r935). 
47 Hamilton v. University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 265-268 (r935). An incident on the 
side-lines of the decision throws a light upon a facet of Cardozo's character. At a small dinner, 
at which Mr. Cardozo was present, the conversation turned to liberty, and there was much talk 
about how the very concrete liberties of the later middle ages had, under the stress of political 
circumstance, been hammered into an abstract imponderable called "liberty." As Mr. Cardozo 
was going, he remarked, "Watch my next opinion." It was there. In arguing that the privilege 
in question was not within the heritage of religious liberty delivered by the First Amendment 
to the Fourteenth, Cardozo disposed of the issue: "In controversies of this order courts do not 
concern themselves with matters of legislative policy unrelated to privileges or liberties secured 
by the organic law." Ibid. 266. 
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"should receive an answer."-48 Nowhere is Cardozo more conscious of 
what he does. In the name of "the organic law," he is :fitting out the 
Fourteenth Amendment with the sanctions of the First. 
It was, however, in respect to the New Deal cases that Cardozo did 
his most distinctive work. He nowhere expresses an approval of meas-
ures, for they involved choice of policies and their accommodation to the 
changing circumstances of the country-that does not pertain to his 
office. But he is aware of the depression, recognizes the national economy, 
knows that the secret of the industrial order evades us, is convinced of 
. the necessity of trial and error, and is unwilling to deny to the govern-
ment the power to govern. The course of the Court presents a graphic 
cycle of shifting attitude. In 1934 it was willing to allow remedial legisla-
tion to take its course;49 by the beginning of the next year, still timid in 
the face of the emergency, it was using procedural devices against federal 
statutes. 5° But the defects of an improper delegation of power-a doctrine 
incontinently hurried into action-could be cured by the legislature. All 
during the spring of 1935, it was nip and tuck, 51-with the judicial frown 
becoming apparent as the brethren moved from procedure to substance 
to strike down railway retirement52 and the industrial codes.s3 By the 
winter the Court was ready to pass the death sentence upon the Agricul-
turalAdjustmentAct;54 and in the spring of 1936 it laid on with abandon 
against all social legislation, state and national.55 In effect it invited into 
48 Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441, 455 (1935). After further litigation the matter again 
came before the Court. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937), and the conviction under the 
ancient statute was set aside. 
49 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Home Loan and Building Corp. v. Blaisdell, 
290 u.s. 394 (1934). 
s• Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
sr There is no royal road to an easy critique. To catch the atmosphere, to note the manner 
of work, and to watch the decisions emerge, the reader must turn the pages of the Reports. 
Note especially Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 294 U.S., 240, 317, 333 (1935); Nash-
ville, Chattanooga and St. Louis Ry. v. Walters, 294 U.S. 405 (1935); Baldwin v. Seelig, 
294 U.S. 5II (1935); Standard Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis, 294 U.S. 56o (1935); and Senior v. 
Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935). 
52 Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
53 Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). Stone joined Cardozo in a 
concurring opinion, 
54 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. I (1936). 
ss Again there is no substitute for recourse to the Reports. See especially Borden's Farm 
Products Co. v. TenEyck, 297 U.S. 251, 266 (1936); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 
297 U.S. 288 (1936); Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U.S. I (1936); 
Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Import 
District, No. r, 298 U.S. 513 (1936); and Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 
587 (1936). 
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court parties to whom legislation was disagreeable, touched off the late 
epidemic of "the higher lawlessness," and threatened to paralyze the ac-
tivities of government. Men must be stirred deeply to indulge in conduct 
such as this; and the opinions of the Court stemmed from sources far 
more compelling than any law of the Constitution. In an unreasoning 
fear of the President's power the thought of Hughes strayed far from its 
familiar moorings; the ghost of an imaginary fascism appeared for a time 
to deflect Brandeis from his orbit; and even Stone faltered and went with 
the majority in the hot-oil case. 
But a vacillation unto indignation was not for Cardozo. As a lawyer 
and a judge, he maintained throughout the even temper of his ways. He 
kept his vision keen ancl true and refused to allow constitutional issues 
to be muddled by seeing things at night. He made no distinction between 
the right of the state to fi)c prices, when the issue was up in 1934 and when 
it was up in 1936. Nor could he discover within the supreme law a sanc-
tion which made price-fixing valid in respect to milk and invalid in re-
spect to labor.s6 He could not follow the delicate distinction between 
remedy and prevention which sanctioned a legislative moratorium on the 
farmer's mortgage and condemned an act of Congress intended to put 
his feet in the way of solvency. And yet to validate the moratorium the 
injunction against impairing the obligation of contract had to be explained 
away and to strike down the AAA an esoteric rabbit had to be juggled 
out of the taxation clause.57 In t'he hot-oil case Cardozo saw that the 
decision was out of step with the growth of government by commission 
and the march of constitutional doctrine.58 He had "no fear that the 
nation will drift from its ancient moorings as a result of the narrow delega-
tion of power." In the NRA case he clearly perceived that "the industries 
of the country are too many and too diverse for Congress to set up definite 
standards for regulation."59 In respect to coal he insisted that there was 
nothing sacred about a "free competition" that does not work and that 
"the liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment does not include the right 
to persist in this anarchic riot."60 
It is to Ca~dozo that credit is due for preserving the spark of sanity in 
s6 Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 
u.s. 587 (1936). 
s7 Home Loan and Building Corp. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 394 (1934); United States v. Butler, 
297 U.S. I (1936). 
ss Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
59 Schechter Poultry Co. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
6° Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
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a period of judicial panic. It is to his everlasting credit that during the 
darkest of days he met intolerance with tolerance. By 1937 the cycle 
had run its course; judges recovered, as if by a miracle, their judicial poise; 
and, before a single change had been effected in its membership, the Court 
proceeded to smother its backward-looking decisions beneath more human 
entries. A body of constitutional doctrine, lately overlooked or relegated 
to dissent, was rediscovered.61 A minimum wage, long kept waiting by the 
act of God and a majority of one, was brought into accord with the 
higher law.6• The ground lost to federal power was regained with sub-
stantial additions in a series of decisions asserting the authority of the 
nation in the :field of industrial relations and collective bargaining.63 
Cardozo himself spoke for the Court in putting the stamp of the Constitu-
tion upon an act of Congress designed to bring "social security" to the 
American people.64 The law reports will be searched in vain for an in-
stance in which a court has so speedily and completely vindicated the 
opinions of a brother spoken in dissent. 
One must not endow Cardozo's work with the superhuman touch or 
take from him the quality of human frailty. He bought his own knowl-
edge with experience. His facile rhetoric hides many an argument that 
does not click or marches to a wrong conclusion. The specialist in con-
~m~m~~~~~~a~~~~~ 
He could meet the problems of turbulent times with only such an under-
standing as he possessed. In rate cases his skill falters; items which add 
up to valuation are passed in review with none too critical an eye. A 
disposition to accept without question the entries of the companies rep-
resents a presumption, indigenous to the criminal law, but strangely alien 
to the purposive accountancy of big business.65 As a member of the court 
he fumbles with the realities of the milk industry. The prevailing scheme 
61 In I935 and I936 as much constitutional law was lost as was made. In I937 the lost was 
retrieved. A beautiful essay can be done in comparing the citations in the opinion of the court 
and in dissent in Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) with those in 
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (I937), or in Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 
U.S. 238 (I936) with National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 301 
U.S. I (I937). 
6• West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (I937). 
6J National Labor Relations Board v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 30I U.S. I (I937); 
The Associated Press v. National Labor Relations Board, 30I U.S. I03 (1937); Washington, 
Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. I42 (I93 7 ). 
64 Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 30I U.S. 548 (I937); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
6I9 (I937). 
6s For example see West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Utilities Committee of Ohio, 294 U.S. 
63 (I935). Stone's concurring opinion, ibid., 77 presents a far closer approach to realism. 
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of arrangements is strongly at variance alike to the free competition 
which McReynolds wished to preserve and the open market which Rob-
erts wanted the state to help over the hard places.66 Cardozo's wisdom 
fell before the enigma of the milk-shed. He declared invalid, as infringing 
the domain of inter-state commerce, a section of the New York act 
fixing prices paid to producers outside the state for milk sold within it.67 
Yet the power of the municipality to inspect pays no regard to state 
lines; and the effect of his decision was to leave the farmer within the 
commonwealth helpless as to price. 
He failed the cause of civil liberty in respect to the vote of the black 
man. In Texas, where a single party makes of the primary an election, 
the legislature said that the Negro could not vote in the choice of Demo-
cratic candidates. The Court, through Holmes, invalidated the act in the 
name of the Fourteenth Amendment.68 Next a statute of the state con-
ferred upon the party the right to fix its own qualifications. The party 
excluded the negro and the Court, through Cardozo, struck down the 
arrangement.69 Finally the state repealed its legislation and the party, 
quite uninstructed, arranged suffrage to its liking. Then the Court, 
through Roberts, found the party to be a private club, denied that its 
act was the act of the state, and put the issue beyond the reach of the 
higher law.1o Cardozo was silent; yet, if a compelling argument was not 
at hand, germs of doctrine might have been set down in a dissent. 7x The 
result is that the protection accorded the negro's vote by the Fifteenth 
Amendment is conditional; the state must not formally abri9-ge it but 
may :filch it away by indirection. 
A judge who has discovered verity can make no such mistakes; he can 
flaunt no such shortcomings. In spite of flaw, frailty and failure to rise 
to the occasion Cardozo is still Cardozo. For to him law is no revelation 
immune to growth through knowledge and experience. 
66 Nebbia v. New York, 29I U.S. 502 (r934). For a critique of the opinions of the court and 
the dissent, in this and other milk cases, against the background of the arrangements in the 
industry, see Irene Till, "Milk: the Politics of an Industry," in Hamilton and Associates, Price 
and Price Policies 5oo-5o8 (r938). 
67 Baldwin v. Seelig, 294 U.S. 5II (r935). 
68 Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (r926). 
69 Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (r932). 
7° Grovey v. Townsend; 295 U.S. 45 (r935). 
1• It may be that a compelling constitutional argument could not be contrived. But all 
great principles spring from germs of doctrine; and, in current legal and political thought, 
enough was at hand for an arresting dissent. For evidence see "Should Negroes Vote," in 83 
New Republic 356 (r935); and "Black Justice," r4o Nation 497 (r935). 
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IV 
Thus for us Cardozo takes his place in the great tradition. If our judg-
ment comes to endure, his work entitles him to rank with Holt and Mans-
field, Gibson and Shaw and Cooley, Marshall, Taney and Brandeis. They 
are alike in making the law the instrument of justice; the craft of each 
reflects the manner of the man. In all else Cardozo is as unlike them as 
they are to each other. Marshall was the great theologian, at home with 
truth, proclaiming an ultimate dogma. Cardozo is the inquisitive scien-
tist, putting himself to no end of bother, and setting down the tentative 
hypothesis. A Marshall in cathedral tones lays down the eternal verities; 
a Cardozo can only set down in its finiteness the best of his understanding. 
Marshall was a belated product of the age of reason; Cardozo, an advance 
prophet of an era of inquiry. 
Even in such a company Cardozo has distinction. From his law the 
ghost of theology has vanished and the spirit of trial and error has come 
to the aid of logic. His craft is rarely more than the servant of justice; 
it is only when it escapes his control that it becomes the master. Fact, 
value, the-difference-it-will-make are at hand to define legal concept, to 
take rigidity from formula, and to direct technical argument. An ordi-
nary judge often rises to the heights in a great case; it takes the great 
jurist to achieve the significant result through a scattering of ordinary 
cases. Yet even when confronted by petty causes Cardozo does not de-
scend to clerk's law; he is the artist in miniature as well as in masterpiece. 
Only Holmes is his equal in suiting his words to the very life of his ideas. 
In the exercise of his calling a great judge may be a man of letters; 
Cardozo elevates the jurist's craft to a fine art. We owe it to Holmes and 
to Cardozo that in the law journals, almost alone among learned periodi-
cals, literacy is still respectable. 
We cannot, however, assign to Cardozo his exact place in the great 
tradition. The entries are too fresh for time to give its perspective. In 
the long run it is not what is, but what is made of it, that counts. In 
law, as in all human creation, the present turns what is gone to its own 
account. As age has given way to changing age, each in its tum has man-
aged to make the Bible a contemporary document. The God of Holy 
Writ has donned the robes of Prince of Peace, Lord of Hosts, Lord and 
Proprietor of the Universe. And shorn of the last sheet of his anthropo-
morphic being he has made a twentieth century appearance as the spir-
itual version of the mechanistic law of cause and effect. A common text 
alone identi:fi!'!S the Bard of Avon with the Shakespeare we know; be-
tween our eyes and the words lie three centuries of social change, the thick 
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crust of a cloistered pedantry, and the intoned lines of the grand manner. 
The King James version, as much English as Bible, is father to the 
Homeric idiom most of us know; Plato speaks to us as Victorians with 
the accent of Jowett; and Adam Smith proclaims economic verity in the 
tones of a Liberty Leaguer. Malthus was no Malthusian; Karl Marx 
wrote in a tongue unknown to current Marxists. 
The law can claim no immunity from a common frailty. In its dici-
pline vested words forever take on fresh meaning. Magna Carta was 
fashioned as a seventeenth century expediency out of a forgotten feudal 
document. If the Stuart Kings were to be defied, conscience had to be 
appeased with an ancient sanction. William Blackstone's Tory commen-
taries on the law of England became the Bible-of the profession to judges 
in the American democracy. Writings live, not by reason of the worth 
inherent in them, but because of their accord with interests which later 
come to prevail. The great mass of polemic is consigned to oblivion; the 
few that are saved-pamphlets, treatises, precedents-are remade to wear 
the livery of a later master. The words of the jurist who is gone are lifted 
from their occasions; meanings not in his mind make their homes in his 
sentences; rules are shunted from pristine purpose into alien servitudes. 
The gloss usurps the place of the text. As a judge's utterances ripen into 
precedent, he is accounted petty or great, not for what he said, but for 
the values with which tradition has endowed his words. 
If an institution is to live, it must continue to renew its youth. The law, 
steeped in precedent and heavy with ritual, has never found it easy to 
slough off the obsolete and to make way for novelty. With a look ahead-
and without a break with the past-it must be kept an enduring instru-
ment of justice. Cardozo was concerned, within the ambit of his influ-
ence, to make articulate the awakening impulses of the age in which he 
lived. It is enough that to him the law was, not a brooding omnipresence 
in the skies, but the living law. 
